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ABSTRACT 
This article revisits over sixty years of Supreme Court decisions that have affected the 
poor and racial minorities, using a novel approach that considers the synergistic relationship 
between different doctrinal areas rather than focusing on one area. Specifically, I appraise the 
Supreme Court’s doctrinal contributions from 1953 to the present across three foundational 
elements of social justice on behalf of the poor and people of color: the school integration cases 
under the Equal Protection Clause, a series of cases under the Fourth Amendment which 
sanctioned the police tactic of stop-and-frisk, and attempts to secure economic security for the 
poor through the Constitution under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.   
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I find that the Warren Court, which is widely considered the most progressive court in 
U.S. history, failed in several respects. It damaged, rather than abetted, the cause of economic 
justice. And what it gave to Black children in terms of educational opportunity, it took away 
from their future selves, their adult community members, and their caretakers by facilitating the 
mass incarceration of Black men through the practice of stop- and-frisk. I also show how the 
conservative Courts that followed diluted any gains from this era. I conclude that the Supreme 
Court has been more foe than friend, and has abandoned, rather than protected, the poor and 
racial minorities. I draw from this history lessons for the present, including strategies for 
advancing social justice in the current political and legal environment. 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions permeate virtually every aspect of social welfare policy. 
Because many policy disputes become legal questions, the Court has an inescapable and crucial 
role in making social policy.1 Social, political, and economic questions, such as how society 
should distribute resources, what the state owes its citizens and what citizens owe each other, and 
how far the state can intervene in citizens’ lives are grist for the Court. Historically, social 
movements campaigning for civil rights, gender equality, or economic security have viewed the 
judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, as a potential and essential ally.2 Under the Trump 
Administration, where long-standing governing norms and practices have been upended,3 the 
                                                 
1 For a discussion and examples of the Supreme Court’s policy making role, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY 
AND ITS CRITICS (1989); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991); LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT (9th ed. 2007); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY & SANFORD 
LEVINSON, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (2016).  
2 ROSENBERG, supra note 1.  
3 See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CAN IT HAPPEN 
HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (2018).  
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judiciary is often viewed as a bulwark against discriminatory executive actions and against a 
rollback of rights.   
This, then, is an opportune time to revisit and assess whether the Supreme Court has been 
a force for social justice, or an obstacle to it. The most common method of conducting this 
analysis typically focuses on a specific social movement or cause, such as civil rights or 
women’s rights, analyzing seminal cases, usually Supreme Court cases, and the real-world 
effects of the cases over time.4 Disenfranchised groups, however, suffer from multiple 
intersecting disadvantages that cumulatively effect a community and people’s well-being. The 
Court’s concern is the case before it—not other ways in which citizens may be disadvantaged. Its 
allocation of rights can be episodic and irregular; rights granted by the Court in one area may be 
diminished by its erosion of rights elsewhere, creating a zero-sum game in the pursuit of social 
justice. Thus, rather than using the common method of analysis, I appraise the Supreme Court’s 
doctrinal contributions across multiple social justice claims to attain a more complete picture of 
gains and losses.  
I focus on three foundational elements of social justice on behalf of the poor and people 
of color that have been addressed by the Supreme Court: equal educational opportunities, 
intrusive policing practices that primarily target minority neighborhoods, and economic security. 
More specifically, I focus on the following distinct bodies of Supreme Court constitutional 
jurisprudence: the school integration cases, which expanded opportunities for people of color 
                                                 
4 For the paradigmatic example of this approach see Rosenberg, supra note 1 (analyzing civil rights, abortion and 
women’s rights as distinct case studies). For other examples, see ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR 
(1997) (analyzing the Warren Court’s doctrinal approach to welfare benefits); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW 
TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (examining the Supreme Court’s decisions on racial equality); Lewis R. Katz, Terry v Ohio 
at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423 (2004) (hereinafter Lewis R. Katz) (examining the Supreme 
Court’s decisions on stop-and-frisk). For the long-running debate of the role of the Court as an instigator and driver 
of social change, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2004); Malcolm M. 
Feely, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 745 (1992).   
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through the integration of public schools under the Equal Protection Clause;5 a series of cases 
under the Fourth Amendment which sanctioned the police tactic of stop-and–frisk 6, thus 
contributing to the phenomenon of mass incarceration; and attempts to secure economic security 
for the poor through the Constitution, including the Due Process7 and Equal Protection Clauses, 
which largely failed.   
I chose these three areas, out of the many social justice issues addressed by the Court 
over the last half century, for several reasons. First, all three are entwined—racial equality 
requires both opportunities for an equal education and economic security, and mass incarceration 
within disadvantaged communities can interfere with the attainment of both. Thus, together they 
demonstrate the synergistic consequences of Supreme Court decisions. Second, two of these 
issues—education and economic security—were the specific focus of planned litigation 
campaigns connected to social movements. These movements, including the Civil Rights and 
Welfare Rights Movements, were aimed at the Warren Court, considered the most progressive 
court in U.S. history. Thus, they generated a body of precedential case law that has reverberated 
into the present and is key to understanding the Court’s evolving response to social justice 
claims.  
In Part I, I focus on the seminal and significant cases in each area. While these cases were 
decided over half a century ago, they laid the foundation for the decades—and disputes—to 
                                                 
5 U.S. CONST. art. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause is from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause 
took effect in 1868, provides “nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”  
6 U.S. CONST. art IV. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government. 
7 A Due Process Clause is found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the government except as authorized by law. 
U.S. CONST. arts V, XIV. 
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come. In Part II, I consider the durability of these decisions by examining how the Court 
interpreted its own precedents over time. I cross doctrinal boundaries throughout to illustrate the 
synergistic relationship between Court decisions. I conclude that over time, and across doctrinal 
areas, the Supreme Court has been more foe than friend, and has abandoned, rather than 
protected, the poor and racial minorities.  
PART I: THE EARLY YEARS  
Brown v. Board of Education, decided in 1954, ended over a hundred years of segregated 
public school in the United States.8 It is regularly characterized as a landmark case that 
revolutionized race relations in the United States. It also marked the beginning of a new strategy 
for securing social justice—engaging the judiciary. Sensing that change was more likely in the 
courts than in Congress, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) formulated a litigation strategy to overturn the legacy of Jim Crow.9 The NAACP’s 
strategy of planned litigation campaigns was emulated by other groups, including legal advocates 
for the poor, resulting in a plethora of cases during this era aimed at advancing social justice.10  
The 1960s is thus often remembered as a singular time in America, and the Court that 
reigned then—the Warren Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1953 to 1969—is widely 
considered an activist liberal court that expanded constitutional rights in unprecedented ways.11 
Its reign coincided with a particularly fervent decade for social movements, including the 
struggle for racial and gender equality, welfare rights, and opposition to the Vietnam War.12 
                                                 
8 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
9 Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693 (2004). 
10 MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960–1973 (1993). 
11 William Eskridge, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s: Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991). 
12 Mimi Abramovitz, in THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY (Joel Blau ed., 2004); FELICIA KORNBLUH, 
THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS (2007). 
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Thus, the Warren Court left its imprint on many of the most controversial issues of the day, 
achieving a near mythic status in the annals of social change and the Court.13 As discussed 
below, from a doctrinal perspective across the three areas studied, this view is less justified. 
While the Court’s integration decisions worked in tandem with the goals of the Civil Rights 
Movement, it diluted the protections of the Fourth Amendment and exponentially increased the 
likelihood of the mass incarceration of people of color by sanctioning the police tactic of stop-
and-frisk without probable cause. While Court decisions provided welfare recipients some 
protection from arbitrary and exclusionary government action in the implementation of welfare 
programs, the Court rebuffed attempts to secure a Constitutional right to welfare and economic 
security, thus abetting, rather than confronting, the problem of economic inequality.   
A. Expanding Educational Opportunity: The Quest to End Segregation 
The NAACP’s strategy was to first whittle away at segregation in less visible educational 
locales, specifically graduate schools, and to render the legal doctrine of “separate but equal” too 
costly to enforce by requiring states to make Black educational institutions equal to white 
institutions. Thus, by the time Brown v. Board of Education appeared on the Supreme Court’s 
docket, earlier Courts had already decided three cases that signaled the coming end of public 
school segregation. In Gaines v. Canada,14 the Court upheld the separate but equal doctrine, but 
required a white law school to admit lack students because there was no comparable school for 
them. In Sweatt v. Painter,15 the Court required states to spend equal sums of money on their 
                                                 
13 While Chief Justice Warren retired in 1969, it was not until President Nixon’s appointment of four new justices 
by 1972 that conservatives achieved a majority coalition of justices. Their power and influence can also take years 
to emerge in any one area, as the Court’s docket is controlled by the cases that come before it. See Jack M. Balkin, 
What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2004). Thus, Part I includes this 
transitional period and ends in 1972.  
14 Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
15 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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lack law schools and white law schools, making it prohibitively expensive to continue 
segregating the law schools. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,16 the Court prohibited the 
states from segregating lack doctoral students in the lunchrooms and classrooms of a previously 
all-white institution.  
At the time Brown was decided, over half the states either prohibited segregation in 
public schools or did not address it, while twenty-one states, mostly in the South, either required 
or allowed it.17 Unusual for the Court, Brown took two years to decide, and was argued twice. 
The delay was attributed to the issue at stake, and the appointment of new Chief Justice Earl 
Warren in the midst of the case, who delayed the decision until all nine Justices agreed to rule 
against segregation.18 
 Brown was a short decision—a mere 10 pages. It was also short on practicalities, telling 
states to end segregation, but not how to do it—a process which would take many years, and 
many more court decisions, to untangle. It read at times more like a sermon than a legal opinion. 
One of its most notable and memorable passages was its admonition that “To separate [children] 
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”19 It also included a paean to public education, declaring it as 
“perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,” “the very foundation of 
good citizenship” and a “right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”20 
                                                 
16 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
17 ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 42.  
18 Id. at 42–43.  
19 Id. at 494.  
20 Id. at 493.  
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A year later, the Court spoke again in Brown II, this time to the practicalities and speed of 
integration.21 Its admonition that integration must take place “with all deliberate speed” became 
the watchword of integration efforts, an acknowledgment that it must happen, but not instantly.22 
The Court itself noted that schools needed time to revamp school districts, facilities, personnel, 
and transportation systems. By assigning the lower federal courts to oversee these efforts, the 
Court recognized the complexity of integration, while embroiling hundreds of courts in these 
decisions over the ensuing decades.23  
Resistance to Brown by the states was swift, and came in different forms, from outright 
defiance to more insidious legislative and other maneuvers to avoid integration. The best-known 
example of the former was Arkansas’s deployment of National Guard troops to physically block 
Black students from entering Central High School in Little Rock. Legislative fixes included 
varying degrees of subterfuge, such as shutting down public schools and paying for white 
students to attend private schools staffed by their former public school teachers,24 or creating 
seemingly race-neutral “Freedom of Choice” plans which resulted in white students choosing 
only white schools, and most Black students remaining in Black schools. 
The Warren Court spoke strongly, and with one voice, in response to these attempts. 
When the Little Rock School Board asked for a two and a half year delay in integration efforts 
because of the hostility, the Court in Cooper v. Aaron emphatically said no, convening a special 
summer session before the next school year, where it made clear that Brown was “the supreme 
law of the land”25 and that it could not be “nullified openly and directly by state legislators or 
                                                 
21 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
22 Id. at 301.  
23 For a critical view of the implementation of Brown, see KLARMAN, supra note 4. 
24 ROBERT R. SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS (1965).  
25 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
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state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for 
segregation.”26 In Griffin v. County School Board, decided ten years after Brown, the Court held 
that subsidizing white-only private schools after closing down public schools violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.27 The Court also expressed its frustration at the slow pace of integration, 
admonishing that “the time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out.”28 Four years later, in Green 
v. County School Board, the Court expanded Brown even further. It commanded schools to not 
only stop discriminating, but to actively take steps to integrate. It thus not only invalidated a 
school board’s Freedom of Choice plan but ordered it to take affirmative steps “in which racial 
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”29  
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, decided in 1971, the Court 
responded to the hundreds of cases flooding the courts by providing more specific guidance on 
achieving integration.30 While rejecting racial balancing, which would require schools to reflect 
the overall racial composition of the system, it sanctioned the use of race-conscious remedies by 
allowing the use of “mathematical [racial] ratios” as a “starting point.”31 It also struck at the root 
cause of segregation—residential housing patterns—by sanctioning busing, and the 
gerrymandering of “administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre” school districts 
and attendance zones.32 
In sum, the decade and a half after Brown saw a muscular and assertive Court determined 
to counter resistance and remove roadblocks to integration. Brown also galvanized the Civil 
                                                 
26 Id. at 17. 
27 Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
28 Id. at 234.  
29 Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
30 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
31 Id. at 25. 
32 Id. at 28. 
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Rights movement. The Montgomery Bus Boycott began a year after the decision. 
Demonstrations and protests spread throughout the South, including in Birmingham and Selma.33 
In 1964 the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act were passed, “plac[ing] Congress’s seal of 
approval on Brown and the project of desegregation, and [making] civil rights a national 
commitment of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.”34 
B. “Right to Live”: Advocating for the Economic Security of the Poor 
Civil Rights and economic security are inextricably linked, as disadvantaged groups not 
only vie for better educational opportunities as a route out of poverty, but also economic security 
in their everyday lives.35 The decades before and after Brown was a precarious time for the poor 
and especially poor Blacks. Mechanization eliminated many agriculture jobs in the South, 
triggering the Great Migration as Blacks migrated to the North, and primarily urban areas, in 
search of jobs.36 However, a shortage of jobs resulted in a simmering and increasingly more 
visible poor, and Black populations in the inner cities.37 
While public assistance programs such as Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) could 
provide needed aid to poor Black women, historically, they were excluded from such 
programs.38 When ADC was enacted, it was aimed at primarily white widows, second class 
citizens to male workers, but perceived to be more deserving than Black women.39 Morality 
                                                 
33 HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, EDS., VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S xix (1990). 
34 Balkin, supra note 13, at 1548. 
35 Davis, supra note 10, at 121.  
36 FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
(1993). 
37 Id.  
38 MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT (1996).  
39 Id. 
10





tests, imposed through law and enforced by bureaucrats, had excluded many Black women 
through “suitable home provisions.”40 Their exclusion from ADC also ensured a steady stream of 
workers in exploitative and low-paying agriculture and domestic jobs, particularly in the South.41  
This time, though, shifting attitudes towards the poor sparked a more receptive response. 
Books such as Michael Harrington’s, The Other America: Poverty in the United States, 
highlighted a growing disparity between the “haves” and the “have-nots” and punctured societal 
assumptions about prosperity in America.42 The existence of poverty amid so much affluence 
became less politically and socially acceptable, with the country awakening to the fact that the 
poor had not disappeared during the post-World War II economic boom.  
As with racial inequality, the response came from below and above. In 1964 President 
Johnson launched his War on Poverty with a plethora of programs.43 In 1966, the National 
Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) was born, a grassroots organization consisting of mostly 
African American women advocating for increased and accessible welfare benefits and overall 
economic security.44 As with the fight for racial equality, this movement had a legal avatar in the 
form of the Legal Services Program, one of the federally funded War on Poverty programs. In 
contrast to existing Legal Aid programs for the poor, Legal Services Programs thought bigger, 
seeking to change the system through high impact litigation.45 Inspired by the NAACP’s 
litigation campaign, Edward Sparer, first an attorney at the legal services program Mobilization 
for Youth and then the Director of Columbia University, laid out a strategy for using the courts 
                                                 
40 LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994). 
41 Abramovitz, supra, note 38.  
42 MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962).  
43 Kornbluh, supra note 12.  
44 Id.   
45 Davis, supra note 10, at 33. 
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to create a “bill of rights” for welfare recipients. 46 This strategy was rooted in the Constitution 
and would establish a constitutional right to economic security, or as Sparer called it, a “right to 
live.”47 The legal campaign had both short- and long-term goals. The long-term goal was to 
transform welfare from a categorical entitlement to a universal and constitutional right.48 The 
short-term goal was to end the exclusion of certain groups from Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC).49 
The campaign’s first case—King v. Smith—was aimed at the categorical exclusions that 
hit Black women and their children the hardest—the “suitable home” provisions.50 The plaintiff, 
Sylvester Smith, was a Black woman with four children living in Alabama on a waitress’s salary 
and welfare aid.51 Occasionally, a married man with nine children of his own would visit her on 
weekends and stay over.52 She was cut off from aid under a state rule initiated by Governor 
George Wallace, which denied aid to women who “cohabitated” with a man, which meant 
having “frequent or continuing” sexual relations at the women’s home, or elsewhere.53 Alabama 
viewed these men as “substitute parents” whether or not they lived with or provided support for 
the children, or were legally obligated to do so.54 Ninety percent of the children who were cut off 
                                                 
46 Davis, supra note 10, at 36. 
47 Id. at 81.  
48 Id. at 104.  
49 William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1821 (2001). The ADC program became AFDC in 1950 when parents, and not just their children, were allowed to 
receive benefits. Id. at 1839. 
50 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
51 Id. at 315 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 314.  
54 Id. at 313–314.  
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from aid were Black.55 Eighteen other states had similar rules, affecting about 500,000 
children.56  
The case was part of the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law’s Southern strategy 
for constitutionalizing welfare, which focused on the South because of its deep poverty, but also 
because Southern federal judges had been exposed to the use of the courts for social change 
through successful civil rights litigation.57 It was also part of the Center’s strategy to link poverty 
and civil rights together, much as Martin Luther King’s Poor People’s Campaign expanded civil 
rights to include “the right to a decent livelihood.”58  
While there was a constitutional argument to be made—that the rule resulted in a denial 
of equal protection—the winning argument was a statutory one, namely that the AFDC program 
was designed to help all eligible needy children, not just some of them. In a unanimous opinion, 
the Court invalidated the rule. As the Court summed it up, “destitute children who are legally 
fatherless cannot be flatly denied federally funded assistance on the transparent fiction that they 
have a substitute father.”59 
The Court also acknowledged the long history of “morality tests” from ADC’s inception, 
including a preference for “the worthy poor” in public welfare programs, while “others were 
thought unworthy because of their supposed incapacity for ‘moral regeneration.’”60 It portrayed 
such views as both outdated and contrary to Congressional action, as expressed in the Fleming 
                                                 
55 Forbath, supra note 49, at 1859.  
56 Davis, supra note 10, at 68.   
57 Id. at 60.  
58 Forbath, supra note 49, at 1842.   
59 King, 392 U.S. at 334. 
60 Id. at 320.  
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Rule, adopted in 1961, which prohibited the denial of aid to needy children based on the 
conditions of the home, and other legislation which provided funds for rehabilitating families 
rather than denying them aid.61 This more enlightened view had its limits, though. While 
“rehabilitation” as an alternative to punishing children for the sins of the parent was, according to 
the Court, “more sophisticated and enlightened than the worthy person concept of earlier 
times,”62 the Court and Congress’s emphasis on rehabilitation suggested that such women still 
carried the taint of immorality. Nonetheless, King put 20,000 children back on the rolls in 
Alabama, and 500,000 more in the eighteen other states with similar rules.63  
The next case—Shapiro v. Thompson—aimed to end another vestige of the Poor Laws: 
residency requirements for AFDC, which required newcomers to a state to wait at least one year 
before applying for benefits.64 Such laws “carried forward a centuries-old tradition of localities 
‘warning out’ wayfaring paupers.”65 Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia had such 
residency laws, claiming that it preserved fiscal funds and deterred the poor from migrating to 
higher benefit states.66  
The Court applied the strictest of constitutional standards under the Equal Protection 
Clause, requiring a compelling state interest because at stake was the fundamental constitutional 
right to travel “throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or 
regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”67 It found no such compelling 
                                                 
61 PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 36, at 140.  
62 Id. at 324–25.  
63 Davis, supra note 10, at 68.  
64 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
65 Forbath, supra note 49, at 1862.   
66 Davis, supra note 10, at 77.   
67 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629. 
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interest and to the contrary defended a welfare recipient’s right to seek out higher benefits:  
[W]e do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life for herself 
and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she considers, among 
others factors, the level of a State’s public assistance. Surely such a mother is no 
less deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take 
advantage of its better educational facilities.68  
The practical reach of the decision was a redistribution to the poor of $125–$175 million a year, 
a significant sum.69 The decision also raised advocates’ hopes that the Court was inching 
towards the prize: a “constitutional right to live.”70  
The next case on the Supreme Court docket involving welfare rights was Goldberg v. 
Kelly, decided in 1970.71 On its face, Kelly was about procedure, not substance; about the right to 
a fair process when aid was denied. The right to an administrative fair hearing to challenge a cut-
off of aid was included in the implementing statute of AFDC in 1935.72 Hearings, though, often 
came too late—after the termination of benefits—forcing participants to live without benefits for 
months at a time while waiting for the administrative machinery to correct a potentially 
erroneous denial. The question for the Court in Kelly was thus the timing of fair hearings, and 
whether the failure to provide a hearing before the termination of benefits violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.73  
 The path to finding a right to a pre-termination hearing was through a reconceptualization 
of welfare, from a “mere charity” to a protected entitlement.74 At the time, welfare was viewed 
                                                 
68 Id. at 632. 
69 Davis, supra note 10, at 80.   
70 Id. 
71 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
72 Id. at 256.  
73 Id. at 255.  
74 Id. at 265.  
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as the former, but the Court in Kelly altered that status, holding that AFDC was a statutory 
entitlement that required due process in the form of a pre-termination hearing before it could be 
discontinued.75 
A more enlightened view of poverty was also on full display in Kelly, which mirrored the 
changing tenor toward poverty in the 1960s. The Court expressed sympathy for the poor, 
recognizing the “brutal need” of welfare recipients who were deprived of “the very means by 
which to live while he waits” and whose situation “becomes immediately desperate.”76 In a 
stirring passage, the Court also absolved the poor for their poverty, lauding welfare as a means 
for promoting American values of social inclusion and equality as embodied in the Constitution: 
From its founding the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity 
and well-being of all persons within its borders. We have come to recognize that 
forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty. . . . Welfare, 
by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of 
the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate 
meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards 
against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified 
frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means 
to “promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity.”77  
 
The hope that the procedural rights announced in Kelly would morph into a substantive 
constitutional right to welfare was dashed that same term in Dandridge v. Williams.78 Dandridge 
involved Maryland’s maximum grant regulation, which capped the amount of public assistance a 
family could receive based on the size of their family, leaving large families with less assistance 
per family member than smaller families. The plaintiffs argued that the regulation discriminated 
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77 Id. at 264–65.  
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against large families in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  
Under Equal Protection jurisprudence, it is crucial to know who is asking for protection. 
Certain groups are considered “suspect classes” because they have been historically 
discriminated against, are politically powerless, and possess immutable characteristics difficult 
or impossible to change.79 Any laws affecting them are subject to the strictest of scrutiny. Brown 
and the integration cases succeeded in part because race and ethnicity fall within this category. 
Laws that involve fundamental rights are also subject to strict scrutiny. However, the promising 
language contained in Shapiro, and then Kelly, that raised hopes that the Court would “bring the 
nation’s poor into the ‘inner circle’ of judicially protected classes,” was dispelled in 
Dandridge.80 
The Court refused to consider the poor as a suspect class, and hence applied the least 
stringent standard of scrutiny, rational basis, stating that:  
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are 
imperfect. If the classification has some “reasonable basis,” it does not offend the 
Constitution simply because the classification “is not made with mathematical 
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.”81  
 
The Court readily accepted the state’s rationales for the regulation, including that it helped 
preserve fiscal funds, acted as an incentive for work and a disincentive for childbearing, and 
helped distinguish between working families and the welfare poor, all of which played into 
stereotypes of the poor as lazy, promiscuous, and different than other Americans. Notably 
                                                 
79 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
80 Forbath, supra note 49, at 1869.  
81 Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485.  
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missing was the inclusive, empathetic, and aspirational language of Kelly that elevated rather 
than denigrated the poor.  
In its closing language, the Court also made clear the limits of Constitutional protection 
for the poor, writing that “The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon 
systems of welfare administration . . . But the Constitution does not empower this Court to 
second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public 
welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.”82 As the Court further explained, 
welfare programs “are not the business of this Court.”83 Advocates felt the loss sharply. As 
described by Sparer: 
A contrary result in Dandridge would have permitted wholesale challenges to the 
barriers created by state legislatures and Congress to deny welfare assistance to 
needy groups of people . . . . The Equal Protection Clause would have become the 
main vehicle for establishing a constitutional guarantee of human life. In these 
and other ways, affirmative judicial scrutiny to guarantee equal protection could 
have led to a different America.84 
 
A subsequent attempt to link welfare more explicitly to race also fell flat. In Jefferson v. 
Hackney, decided in 1972, the plaintiffs argued that the lesser benefits given to AFDC recipients 
in Texas —who were comprised mostly of blacks and latinos—as compared to other “whiter” 
programs for the aged and blind, was evidence of racial discrimination.85 The Court rejected this 
argument, saying the statistical evidence was insufficient to demonstrate discrimination and that 
based on Dandridge, all that was required was a rational basis for the distinction, which it easily 
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83 Id. 
84 As cited by Davis, supra note 10, at 133.  
85 Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 
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found by citing the difference between aged and disabled persons, and the poor in general.  
 In Wyman v. James, decided in 1971, the Court traveled full circle, taking away rather 
than expanding the rights of the poor.86 It allowed the receipt of welfare benefits to be contingent 
upon a visit and search of a recipient’s home, holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply, 
thus treating the homes of welfare recipients different from other citizens whose homes could not 
be breached without a warrant.87 The Court also returned to the language of charity rather than 
entitlements, comparing the receipt of benefits to the receipt of private charity, the givers of 
which “rightly expects” to know how their money is being spent.88  
In short, over a space of only a few years, a welfare rights campaign that began with the 
promise of King, Kelly and Shapiro quickly fizzled, and advocates abandoned their long-term 
goal of establishing a constitutional right to live. Thus, while the Court spoke forcibly about 
education as an equalizing force for Black children, it failed to address the connection between 
race, education and poverty.89 And while the Court was willing to impose wholesale changes on 
the public school system, it was not willing to do the same for the public welfare system. By 
refusing to recognize not only a right to education but a right to live, it read the poor out of the 
Constitution.  
C. Policing the Police: A Step Back 
While Brown and its early progeny represent one route out of poverty through 
educational opportunities, the criminal justice system represents a route into it. Initially, the 
                                                 
86 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).  
87 Id. at 326. 
88 Id. at 319. 
89 See RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007) (Goluboff faults the NAACP at the time of the 
Brown litigation for failing to capture the simultaneous experience of racial discrimination and economic stress 
experienced by many Black families.). 
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Warren Court appeared on track to instituting major constitutional reforms of the criminal justice 
system, as evidenced by its 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio announcing the exclusionary rule and 
its 1966 Miranda v. Arizona ruling imposing the Miranda warning.90 But it quickly reversed 
course, constitutionalizing a form of aggressive policing—stop-and-frisk—that over the ensuing 
decades helped pave the way for mass incarceration.91  
During the 1960s the surge in crime in poor inner-city neighborhoods coupled with urban 
riots led to more aggressive police tactics. Field interrogations were a particular flash point, with 
several states, including New York, adopting more aggressive “stop-and-frisk” policies giving 
police enhanced authority to stop and question persons for investigative purposes, without 
probable cause.92 The Kerner Commission Report, issued in 1967, documented the growing 
friction between police and “minority” communities, noting that “abusive treatment of minority 
groups and the poor continue to occur,” and that “[m]any established police policies . . . alienate 
the community and have no legal basis.”93 It found that field interrogations in particular were “a 
principal problem in police community relations” “as more police departments adopt ‘aggressive 
patrol’ in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street who 
are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily 
evident.”94  
                                                 
90 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be admitted in a criminal trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda 
warning requires police to inform citizens of their right to remain silent and consult with an attorney when in police 
custody. 
91 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
92 Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 1271, 1279–80 (1998).  
93 PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE 
POLICE 178 (1967).   
94 Id. at 184. 
20





Unlike civil rights and welfare rights, challenging such tactics did not rely on the creation 
of new rights. It relied instead upon asserting long-standing rights under the Fourth Amendment, 
which requires probable cause before a person is seized and searched. While such cases were 
supported by social justice organizations, including the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
they were litigated on the defense, on behalf of individuals found guilty of a crime. By the time 
the seminal “stop-and-frisk” case, Terry v. Ohio,95 reached the Supreme Court, the rightward 
shift in American politics had begun, as reflected in the “law and order” rhetoric of politicians 
such as Nixon and Goldwater.96 Brown also put the Court at the epicenter of the civil rights 
backlash, and it became a lightning rod on the 1968 Presidential campaign trail, with “Impeach 
Earl Warren” signs littering highways across the country.97 It was in this context that the Warren 
Court decided Terry in 1968.  
The facts of Terry were a straightforward rendering of the practice, replete with Black 
citizens as its target. A veteran plain-clothes police detective observed two Black men walking 
up and down a block, talking and taking turns looking into a store window, and then talking to a 
third man. The officer believed they were casing the store for a robbery but did not have enough 
evidence to constitute probable cause that a crime was about to be committed. He stopped and 
frisked the men regardless, finding guns on two of them. John Terry, who was charged with 
carrying concealed weapons, sued to have his conviction overturned, alleging the stop and frisk 
violated the Fourth Amendment.98  
                                                 
95 Terry, 392 U.S. 1. 
96 Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL’Y. & SOC. SCI. 221 (2009).  
97 Lewis R. Katz, supra note 4. 
98 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7. 
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The Court recognized that a “stop-and-frisk” was indeed a search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment but noted that the Constitution only forbids unreasonable search and 
seizures. According to the Court, an investigatory stop, which it described as a crime-fighting 
tool that allowed police to investigate and prevent crimes, fell on the reasonable side of the line, 
and hence required less than probable cause. The more watered-down standard, which later came 
to be known as “reasonable suspicion,” could not be based on mere hunches or good faith on the 
part of the arresting officer, but on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”99 Once a stop was 
allowed, where the officer had reason to suspect a weapon might be found, a frisk was allowed to 
protect the officer’s and the public’s safety. According to the Court, the detective met the new 
test because he reasonably suspected a burglary was about to be committed. The frisk, or pat-
down to look for a gun, was constitutional because “stick-ups” involve guns, and the men may 
have been armed and dangerous.100 
The Court did not ignore the effects of stop-and-frisks on minority communities, citing the 
Kerner Commission’s description of the poor relations between minority communities and the 
police, and the use of stop-and-frisk as an instrument of humiliation to control the streets.101 But 
in weighing that against the perceived needs of law enforcement, the latter won out. The lone 
dissenting justice recognized the implications. Allowing an officer to seize and search someone 
without probable cause, Justice Douglas argued, was a “long step down the totalitarian path” 
amounting to nothing less than a rewrite of the Constitution, with the court succumbing to 
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“powerful hydraulic pressures” to “water down constitutional guarantees and give the police an 
upper hand.”102 The racial implications were also apparent: despite recognizing an extensive 
record of police abuses, the Court left the Black community without any safeguards against 
them. As Lewis Katz, a scholar of the Fourth Amendment, described the decision: 
The Court virtually obliterated the Fourth Amendment protections which it had 
imposed on the states, at least for inner city young black men, exposing them, 
without legal protection, to the same police harassment that black men had 
historically faced in their dealings with police dating to the time of slavery.103 
 
In sum, while the Warren Court was responsible for one of the greatest leaps forward in 
America’s race relations—the end of segregation—it also ensured that obstacles to equality 
would remain. It helped pave the way for the caracal state, rerouting many of the country’s Black 
citizens to the criminal justice system and the long-term consequences of incarceration, including 
curtailed opportunities for work and education, and the disruption of families and 
communities.104  
PART II. THE LONG SLIDE DOWN 
In the decades following the Warren Court, subsequent Courts unraveled its biggest 
social justice advance from the 1960s—school integration.105 It refused to recognize structural 
and societal barriers to full integration of the schools, and reinterpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause to protect white interests rather than ameliorating the long history of discrimination 
                                                 
102 Id. at 38–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
103 Lewis R. Katz, supra note 4, at 457. 
104 Western & Wildeman, supra note 96.  
105 Since the Warren Court, every subsequent Chief Justice has been a conservative as follows: the (Warren) Burger 
Court (1969–1986); the (William) Rehnquist Court (1986–2005), and the (John) Roberts Court (2005–present). For 
a discussion of the reasons for the conservative tilt to the Court, see Devins and Baum, n.173.   
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against Blacks.106 The Court also continued to facilitate the phenomenon of mass incarceration 
by further diluting the protections of the Fourth Amendment. As to poverty and economic 
justice, the Court had little opportunity to rule on such issues because of a dearth of cases, as 
legal advocates did not perceive the Court as a receptive forum.107 
A. Integration and the Era of Retrenchment 
With the election of Nixon in 1968 the social justice fervor of the 1960s was broken, and 
the backlash began. Nixon’s road to winning was through the South, and through “disaffected 
whites who disliked both the disorder of the 1960s and the loss of white privilege.”108 The Court, 
to these whites, was out of control, especially in its integration decisions, forcing the busing of 
white children, and otherwise quickening the pace of desegregation. The Court’s response was 
swift and fractious. Nixon’s appointment of four Supreme Court Justices between 1968 and 1971 
destroyed the unanimity the Court had achieved on integration and ushered in a period 
retrenchment.109 
The first sign of a fracturing Court came in Milliken v. Bradley, where the majority (by a 
5–4 vote) overturned an integration plan by the city of Detroit that included the white suburban 
schools that surrounded the predominantly Black city school system.110 The contrast with 
Swann—which recognized the causal link between societal discrimination, including housing 
segregation, and school segregation—could not have been starker, with the majority making a 
distinction between de jure discrimination (discriminatory acts that violate the law) and de facto 
                                                 
106 An important exception occurred in higher education where the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) recognized diversity as a compelling government interest and upheld the right of a law school to use race as a 
“plus” factor in an individualized admission process.  
107 Davis, supra note 10, at 135.  
108 Balkin, supra note 13, at 1555.  
109 These include Warren Burger (1969), Harry Blackmun & Lewis Powell (both in 1970), and William Rehnquist 
(1971). 
110 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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segregation (segregation caused by societal discrimination). It held that the latter could not serve 
as a basis for a remedy, and hence invalidated Detroit’s plan even though including the suburban 
schools was the only way to achieve integration.111 The dissent sounded the alarm, noting that: 
After [twenty] years of small, often difficult steps toward that great end [of 
integration], the Court today takes a giant step backwards . . . guaranteeing that 
Negro children in Detroit will receive the same separate and inherently unequal 
education in the future as they have been unconstitutionally afforded in the past.112 
In another blow to integration, the Court held that affluent white districts did not have to 
share their wealth and resources with poorly funded, predominantly Black districts. In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court held that there was no constitutional 
right to education, and hence the Equal Protection Clause did not require schools that relied on 
property taxes to correct for inequities across geographic locations.113 The Court’s decision, in 
essence, severed the connection between poverty and equal educational opportunities. Had the 
plaintiffs prevailed, poor school districts across the Nation would have been transformed by the 
infusion of tax funds.  
While the Court remained mostly silent on integration through the 1980s, in the 1990s it 
further denuded integration efforts by ending federal court supervision over school districts, even 
when integration had not been achieved. Thus, in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public 
Schools v. Dowell, the Court refused to reopen a desegregation decree when the school board 
curtailed the busing of black students from inner city homes to outlying white areas, resulting in 
over half of the elementary schools reverting to either 90% black or white.114 Similarly, in 
Freeman v. Pitts, the Court held that district courts had the authority to relinquish supervision 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., with whom Douglas, J., Brennan, J., and White, J. join, dissenting).  
113 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  
114 Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 US 237 (1991). 
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and control over school districts incrementally, and before full compliance was achieved in every 
area.115  
Missouri v. Jenkins continued the Court’s deceleration of integration by further 
narrowing the permissible remedies for improving the quality of schools for Black children.116 
Jenkins involved the Kansas City, Missouri, school district, which, like many urban areas, was 
surrounded by white suburban schools. Because Milliken prevented the school district from 
incorporating these schools in their integration plan, the District Court ordered an alternative 
remedy: make the inner-city schools better, and make them more attractive to white students. It 
ordered the conversion of every senior high and middle school, and one-half of the elementary 
schools into magnet schools that would provide greater educational opportunities to Black 
students, while also attracting white students from the surrounding areas, reversing “white flight” 
from the city to the suburbs.117 The district court also ordered substantial financial investments, 
including capital improvements because school buildings had “literally rotted,” salary increases 
for teachers and staff, and additional spending on remedial programs.118  
The Court, in a 5–4 decision, rejected all these remedies, portraying the magnet schools 
as a subterfuge, or a way to “accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial 
authority to mandate directly: the inter district transfer of students.”119 Since the suburban 
schools had not engaged in de jure discrimination, consistent with Milliken, they could not be 
part of the remedy, even if that remedy left predominantly white schools undisturbed. Spending 
more money to improve Kansas City’s schools was also verboten, because, according to the 
                                                 
115 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
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Court, like housing segregation, the low test scores of its students and generally inferior quality 
of its education were not related to segregation, and hence could not be remedied through an 
integration decree.120  
Twelve years later, in PICS v. Seattle (2007), the Court solidified its transformation of 
the meaning of Brown, using it to protect white children affected by integration plans.121 Past 
cases virtually always involved disputes between Black plaintiffs and school boards arguing over 
the extent of integration efforts. In contrast, PICS was brought by a group of white parents on 
behalf of their children, who were excluded from the schools of their choice. PICS involved two 
different school systems, Seattle and Louisville. Both had a long history of segregation, with 
Seattle entering into voluntary agreements to end segregation, and Louisville court-ordered to do 
so under a decree that had been dissolved years earlier. Both cities used a “racial tie-breaker” to 
integrate schools. Seattle, specifically, in the past had relied on mandatory busing and race-based 
student assignments. It had then refined its plan so that high school students would more likely 
get their first choice of school, but employed a racial tie-breaker for schools that were more 
popular than others, and hence were oversubscribed. Louisville’s plan denied student transfer 
requests from their assigned schools if a request caused the school population to fall outside the 
racial guidelines, which was set at between 15% and 50% for all schools.122  
The case revealed a still-fractured Supreme Court on integration, but with a conservative 
plurality prevailing. The plurality extended the distinction it made between de jure and de facto 
discrimination in Milliken, where predominantly white schools were excluded from integration 
remedies because any segregation was the result of unintentional societal discrimination. Since 
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Seattle was never subjected to a desegregation order and Louisville’s had been dissolved in 
2000, the plurality contended that under Brown race conscious remedies could not be used to 
achieve integration. In other words, schools could not voluntarily choose to use race conscious 
remedies to achieve integration unless at that moment they were intentionally discriminating.123 
Brown, the plurality argued, mandated such a result because it prohibited discrimination based 
on race, which meant any race, or in the oft quoted words of Chief Justice Roberts: “The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”124 
The consequence of the plurality’s holding was game-changing; as the dissent pointed 
out, there were hundreds of voluntary integration plans, and a myriad of state and federal laws 
and executive orders that relied on racial classifications. A “longstanding and unbroken line of 
legal authority,” the dissent argued, allows schools to use race conscious remedies to achieve 
integration, even if they are not compelled to do so.125 According to the dissenters, the very 
meaning and holding of Brown was being eviscerated and history revised:  
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education. The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of his opinion 
states: “Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go 
to school based on the color of their skin.” . . . The Chief Justice fails to note that it 
was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do 
not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other 
ways, the Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court’s most important 
decisions.126 
  
Segregation policies did not simply tell schoolchildren ‘where they could and could 
not go to school based on the color of their skin,’ they perpetuated a caste system 
rooted in the institutions of slavery and eighty years of legalized subordination. The 
lesson of history is not that efforts to continue racial segregation are constitutionally 
indistinguishable from efforts to achieve racial integration. Indeed, it is a cruel 
distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950’s to Louisville and 
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124 Id. at 748.  
125 Id. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
126 Id. 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Seattle in the modern day—to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered 
to attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose 
request to transfer to a school closer to home was initially declined).127 
 
In sum, PICS, decided more than fifty years after Brown, signified its denouement. It was 
a decision with both practical and symbolic messages: that school boards no longer need to strive 
for integration, and that discrimination has no color despite the country’s long and continuing 
history proving otherwise. 
B. Ignoring the Poor 
 The short-lived resurrection of the poor that characterized the 1960s ended in the 1970s, 
with a languishing economy and a return to scapegoating rather than helping the poor.128 The 
War on Poverty transformed into a War on Welfare, with welfare programs increasingly viewed 
as a cause for dependency rather its cure.129 The Court’s 1976 decision in Matthews v. Eldridge, 
which denied a pre-termination hearing to a father whose Social Security Disability benefits had 
been cut off, was emblematic of this trend.130 On its face, there was little to distinguish Kelly 
from the plaintiff in Eldridge—an impoverished father in “brutal need” whose home was 
foreclosed, furniture repossessed and whose family of six was sleeping in one bed. The Court did 
though, claiming that because he had other resources to turn to (the welfare system), “the 
disabled worker’s need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient.” 131 The Court also 
cited the fiscal and administrative burden of imposing pre-termination hearings, in contrast to 
Kelly, where the needs of the poor were paramount.132 
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 The ensuing decades bought little relief for the poor in the Court, which was no longer 
viewed by poverty lawyers and advocates as a potential ally.133 Judicial activism was replaced 
with Congressional activism, not to protect the poor, but to dismantle the welfare system with the 
sixty-year-old AFDC program replaced in 1996 with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) a time limited and work based welfare program.134 The Court’s rare contribution to the 
public debate over public assistance was to contribute to its demise. An example is its decision in 
2012 in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius which invalidated the 
expansion of Medicaid, a primary source of health insurance for the poor, under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare.135 Overall, the Court’s record is 
perhaps most notable not only for how it failed the poor, but how it helped corporations and the 
wealthy, thus insuring the poor’s continued economic insecurity.136  
C. The Road to Racial Profiling 
The Court’s rightward turn in the decade after the 1960s was also reflected in its 
continued support for aggressive police tactics. Unlike Brown, the Warren Court’s Terry decision 
represented a step backward, taking away rights. But it also left ample room for interpretation 
that could either expand or limit its reach. The “reasonable suspicion” standard, like many legal 
tests, is subjective and vague, and open to interpretation by subsequent court decisions and police 
officers on the beat. It also depends on a police officer’s expertise and judgment, both of which 
may be affected by stereotypes and bias, especially in the precincts of minority neighborhoods. 
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In Adams v. Williams the Court, in essence, invited the use of such stereotypes, by allowing 
police officers to consider a “high-crime” neighborhood as a relevant factor under the 
“reasonable suspicion” test.137 In short, it allowed location to serve as a “proxy for race or 
ethnicity”, as poor Black neighborhoods are likely to have high crime rates.138  
In Williams, the Court also allowed an informant’s tip to substitute for an officer’s 
personal observations. In Williams, an individual sitting in his car in a “high-crime area” at 
2:15 a.m. was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist.139 The police officer, acting solely 
on the informant’s tip, tapped on the car window and asked Williams to open the door. When 
Williams rolled down the window the officer reached into the car and removed a gun from 
Williams’ waistband. The officer did not ask Williams if he had a permit for the gun even though 
the state where the arrest occurred allowed persons to carry guns with a permit. He arrested 
Williams for unlawful possession of the pistol, and then conducted a search incident to the arrest, 
finding heroin and other weapons in the car.  
The Court held that both the stop—based on what it described as a reliable tip—and the 
frisk were lawful, the latter because the officer “had ample reason to fear for his safety” given it 
was the middle of the night in a high-crime area.140 By allowing an informant’s tip—which alone 
would not suffice as probable cause—to serve as a basis for a stop and frisk, along with the 
locale, the Court widened its lacuna into the Fourth Amendment. By sanctioning the frisk, the 
Court also demonstrated how easy it was to transform a search for safety into a search for drugs.  
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The dissent recognized the enormity and consequences of the decision. Justice Brennan 
expressed the “gravest hesitancy in extending [Terry] to crimes like the possession of narcotics” 
prophetically suggesting that frisks would become the object of any stop, rather than a safety 
measure.141 In an unusual expression of public regret, Justice Marshall, who voted with the Terry 
majority, suggested he erred in thinking Terry was not tantamount to a “watering down of rights” 
and concluded with his own prescient observation, that “[t]oday’s decision invokes the specter of 
a society in which innocent citizens may be stopped, searched, and arrested at the whim of police 
officers who have only the slightest suspicion of improper conduct.”142  
Over the next several decades, the Court’s expansion of Terry continued, leaving 
increasing numbers of citizen and police encounters outside the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment by describing most such encounters as consensual, and hence not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, and by expanding Terry to most venues where such encounters occur, 
including motor vehicle stops and public transportation.  
Consensual encounters, according to the Court, must pass the “free to leave” test, or 
whether “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.”143 The Court’s application of this standard, 
however, ignores how most people react to police encounters. Most citizens do not know they 
can refuse to talk to a police officer who approaches them on the street, and the police are not 
required to tell them. Police are also trained in “sweet talk,” a psychological technique that 
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143 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  
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begins with “innocuous sounding questions,” escalates into more personal ones, and ends with a 
citizen willing to submit to police authority.144  
The Court’s decision in Florida v. Bostic illustrates the real-world flaws in the “free to 
leave” test.145 In Bostic the Court held that a passenger in the close confines of a bus, with two 
police officers in bright green “raid” jackets with a sheriff’s insignia and touting guns, was free 
to leave when being questioned. “Working the buses,” as it was called, was a police tactic in the 
so-called War on Drugs where police boarded buses as they were about to leave and asking 
random passengers, without any reasonable or individualized suspicion, to inspect their tickets 
and permission to search their luggage.146 Several lower courts had declared the tactic 
unconstitutional because passengers would not feel free to leave the bus, especially as a police 
officer stood over them, blocking the aisle. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that buses 
were public venues where police officers were free to approach any citizens, and citizens were 
free to leave. Any passenger’s “freedom of movement,” the Court explained, “was restricted by a 
factor independent of police conduct—i.e. by his being a passenger on a bus.”147 The dissent had 
a more realistic appraisal of the circumstances. Refusing to answer questions as armed officers 
blocked the aisle would give any passenger pause.148 Moreover, it “would only arouse the 
officers’ suspicions and intensify their interrogation.”149 And getting off the bus would leave 
them stranded, mid-journey, in a bus terminal far from home.150 
                                                 
144 David A. Harris, “Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual 
Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 574–75 (1997).  
145 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
146 Id. at 444.  
147 Id. at 436.  
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
150 Id.  
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The Court’s next stop was the highways and roads, where the vast majority of people are 
likely to interact with a police officer. Once again, the Court displayed a disregard for the real-
life experiences of citizens, and the consequences of eroding Fourth Amendment protections, this 
time during routine traffic violation stops. Thus, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms the Court allowed the 
police to perform a frisk on a driver who was stopped for driving with an expired license plate.151 
The frisk occurred when the driver stepped out of the car at the officer’s request, who then 
noticed a large bulge under his jacket, which a frisk revealed was a gun. According to the Court 
asking a driver to exit a car was a de minimis restriction of the driver’s personal liberty, and 
hence a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Once the bulge was observed, a search 
was warranted because of safety concerns.  
In Whren v. United States, decided 20 years later in 1996, the Court held that traffic 
violations, despite their ubiquity and often triviality, provide the police with probable cause to 
detain a motorist—even if the violation was a deliberate pretext to stop drivers who the officer 
suspected were engaged in a drug-related crime for which the officer did not have probable 
cause, or even reasonable suspicion, that a crime was being committed.152 A year later, in 
Maryland v. Wilson, the Court expanded the holding to passengers, who, like drivers, could be 
ordered out of the car, even though they did not commit a traffic violation.153 Finally, in Heien v. 
North Carolina, the Court held that even when a police officer is mistaken that a traffic violation 
has occurred, reasonable suspicion still exists to support a stop-and-frisk.154  
                                                 
151 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).  
152 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
153 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997). 
154 Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014). 
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The cumulative effect of these cases provides police officers with an almost unfettered 
power to patrol streets, buses and highways—stopping and frisking pedestrians, bus riders, 
drivers and passengers, without the restraining force of the Fourth Amendment. The 
consequences fall most heavily on people of color, who are more likely to be stopped and frisked 
whether walking the streets or driving in cars, than their white counterparts.155 
PART III. LESSONS FROM THE PAST  
Historically, the judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, has been viewed as a 
potential partner, if not an instigator, of social justice and social change. The Warren Court was 
regarded as an exemplar, as an era when the Constitution’s foundational values were fulfilled, 
especially on behalf of the politically powerless. When viewed through the intersection of race, 
poverty, and criminal justice, the picture is murkier.  
To be sure, decisions such as Brown and its immediate progeny were both 
groundbreaking and brave, with the Court “shift[ing] the terrain of discussion, placing the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court behind the cause of racial equality.”156 But what the Warren 
Court gave to Black children in terms of educational opportunity, it took away from their future 
selves, and their adult community members and caretakers, disproportionate numbers of which 
have been incarcerated. The United States has one of the largest prison populations in the world, 
with over two million people incarcerated,157 and with Black males eight times more likely to be 
                                                 
155 Harris, supra note 144; MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CONTACTS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND 
THE PUBLIC (2005).  
156 Balkin, supra note 13, at 1544.  
157 DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
2016 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf. 
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incarcerated than white males.158 While there are many reasons for the phenomenon of mass 
incarceration, Terry stops facilitated its growth.  
The Court also harmed rather than abetted the cause of economic justice. Poverty and 
inequality are at the root of many social problems, and as the Court itself recognized in Kelly, it 
can result in social and civic exclusion.159 But the Court refused to grant the poor the same 
protective status it granted racial minorities and women or to find a right to live under the 
Constitution. This failure reverberated down the decades; when Congress abolished AFDC in 
1996, there was no constitutional basis for challenging it. Had Dandridge resulted in the highest 
level of scrutiny—strict scrutiny—for laws that affected the poor, TANF’s harshest provisions, 
including time limits, work sanctions, and the unequal distribution of benefits across the country 
would have been susceptible to constitutional attack.160   
How subsequent Courts interpreted the Warren Court precedents also exposed the 
fragility of that era’s victories. As Balkin observes, “[c]ases like Brown get their meaning from 
how they are understood and used in the years after they are decided. . . . And the more 
important and iconic the case, the more it gets re-read and rewritten by events.”161 Later Supreme 
Court decisions turned Brown on its head, using it to thwart integration efforts and to protect 
white children, rather than Back children. Today white and Black children are less likely to sit 
together in a classroom than in the 1970s—a consequence, at least in part, of the Court’s 
backtracking on remedies that addressed de facto discrimination, including housing segregation 
                                                 
158 Western & Wildeman, supra note 96, at 228. 
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The notion the Court does not regularly function as a stable force and facilitator of social 
justice is not surprising. As has often been observed, the Court reflects the dominant tenor and 
ideology of its time.163 While regional elite views may vary, as a national institution, the Court 
ultimately reflects the views and ideologies of the national elites.164 During the era of Brown, 
national elite opinion, in contrast to southern regional elites, supported integration and the ending 
of separate but equal.165 Similarly, the 1960s saw a change in tone about the poor, which was 
reflected in the first trio of welfare-related decisions (King, Shapiro and Kelly).166 Like the 1960s 
themselves, however, those sentiments did not endure. Brown was eviscerated by the more 
conservative courts to come, against a backdrop of a ruling conservative majority and a backlash 
against integration. And while the early welfare cases showed some promise, they never ripened 
into a full-blown right to welfare. Like the short-lived War on Poverty, the more radical changes 
a right to welfare would require—whether in labor markets or the meaning of the Constitution—
were never embraced by the ruling national elite. The thwarting of stop-and-frisk appeared never 
to have a chance, with the Court embracing the ethos of “law and order” the same year Nixon 
was elected, and then never reversing course through the decades.   
The lesson learned by critically appraising these cases is a lesson of caution when 
considering the usefulness of the Supreme Court for securing social justice. That the Warren 
Court—the most progressive Court of any era—was limited in the reach and durability of its 
                                                 
162 See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? (The Civ. Rts. 
Project: Harv. Univ., Jan. 2004), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/brown-at-50-king2019s-dream-or-plessy2019s-nightmare/orfield-brown-50-2004.pdf. 
163 See DAHL, supra note 1; MCCLOSKEY & LEVINSON, supra note 1.  
164 Balkin, supra note 13, at 1538. 
165 Id. at 1554.  
166 King v. Smith 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
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decisions illustrates the constraints of judicial intervention. Similarly, that rights granted in one 
era were diminished or even reversed by the Court through later cases, as Brown was, 
demonstrates the impermanence of even groundbreaking decisions. Cases like Brown, and the 
welfare rights cases, also demonstrate the inadequacy of the Court as an arbiter of distributive 
justice or social rights. Unlike rights-based cases that simply strike down unconstitutional laws, 
integrating schools or insuring economic security and the fair distribution of government benefits 
and resources are complex and expensive endeavors that require the input of many state, federal, 
and local actors.167 That the Court ultimately pulled back from Brown and applied only minimal 
scrutiny when determining the constitutionality of social welfare programs, suggests an 
unwillingness to insert itself in these battles.168 Had it done so, inequality’s harsh edges—while 
not ameliorated—may have been softened.  
To be sure, there are causes and cases that suggest a more powerful role for the Court. A 
current example is the evolution of gay rights from Bowers v. Hardwick,169 which upheld the 
right of states to prosecute gay individuals for engaging in sodomy, to Lawrence v. Texas,170 
which reversed Bowers, to Obergefell v. Hodges,171 which held that same-sex couples have a 
right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. But 
for every Obergefell, there may be a Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which set back the cause of 
                                                 
167 Balkin, supra note 13 at 1569.  
168 Id. 
169 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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reproductive rights by limiting the reach of Roe v. Wade, much as Milliken did for Brown and the 
cause of integration.172 
The current political climate suggests that such losses may increase. The 
hyperpolarization and partisanship that has infected the legislative branch has also infiltrated the 
Supreme Court through the selection and appointment of justices. As Devins and Baum found in 
their empirical study of the Court, the contemporary Court is the first Court to be divided sharply 
along partisan lines, reflecting the “polarization in government and in the broader political 
elite.”173 That polarization, though, is not equally divided between liberals and conservatives. 
Since the 1980s, the litmus test for Republican nominees has been considerably stronger than for 
Democratic nominees, with a conservative legal movement, the Federalist Society, providing an 
alternative forum for vetting and recommending nominees.174 The result has been a sharp turn to 
the right for candidates nominated during a Republican administration, culminating in a more 
conservative court that is arguably no longer in sync with national majority views.175 
                                                 
172 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (heightening the state’s role in regulating abortions by 
imposing the “substantial burden” rather than an unfettered right to an abortion during the first trimester under Roe); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
173 Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a 
Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 308 (2017).  
174 The two Justices appointed by President Trump, Neal Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, reflect this dynamic, with 
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175 Devins & Baum, supra note 173. See also Lynn Adelman, The Roberts Court’s Assault on Democracy, 14 HARV. 
L.& POL’Y REV. 131 (2019) for a discussion of the Roberts Court and its conservative bent.  
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PART IV. STRATEGIES FOR A TUMULTUOUS TIME 
The current legal and political environment suggests several strategic paths for social 
justice advocates. In the past, when the Supreme Court failed to find a constitutional right to 
welfare, advocates chose other forums and less ambitious goals such as turning to state courts 
and state constitutions to obtain benefits for distinct groups. Thus, for example, in New York and 
elsewhere, advocates won a series of battles establishing a right to shelter and more generous 
housing allowances under state welfare programs.176 Similarly, state courts were instrumental in 
reducing the use of stop-and-frisk practices based on racial profiling.177 Thus, in the present 
political and legal environment, state (and local) forums, including state courts, should be 
leveraged.  
Further, while the Supreme Court may not be receptive to social justice or rights-based 
claims in the current political environment,178 the lower federal courts may. As Judge Gertner 
has observed, in the past the lower federal courts were more likely to “duck, avoid, or evade” 
politically tinged cases implicating civil rights and other contentious political issues, especially 
when “the system is working” and such disputes could be resolved through “the political 
                                                 
176 VICKI LENS, POOR JUSTICE: HOW THE POOR FARE IN THE COURTS 112–28 (2016).  
177 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding New York City’s stop-and-
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Administration, the issuance of an Executive Order banning nationals of seven Muslim Majority nations from entry 
into the United States in the name of national security. The Executive Order triggered a cascade of litigation, with 
legal advocates arguing that it violated both the First Amendment because it was motivated by religious animus against 
Muslims and the Immigration and Nationality Act, which prohibits discrimination in the issuance of visas. The Court 
upheld the ban, after eleven lower federal courts had stopped it. Vicki Lens, The Travel Ban Cases: A Tale of Two 
Governments, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 67 (2019). Unlike the lower courts, the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision that 
split along partisan lines, failed to consider the religious animus underlying the ban, including the President’s rhetoric, 
and its irregular and unconventional origin and implementation. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). Instead, 
the Court depicted the President’s behavior and actions as well within the bounds of governing norms and procedures 
and a proper exercise of executive power.  
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process.”179 As this is no longer the case in the current political climate, the lower federal courts 
have become a key site for overturning many of the current Administration’s actions in areas as 
diverse as immigration, voting rights, social welfare, and the environment.180 Thus, litigation 
campaigns should be directed to these courts, but strategically targeted to those circuits receptive 
to rights-based claims in the past. To be sure, some of these cases will ultimately be decided, and 
perhaps reversed by the Supreme Court, especially those involving contentious political issues. 
Yet their durability, as in the past, may be affected by subsequent events, as the contest over their 
meaning and application moves into the political sphere.  
Moreover, court cases—won or lost—can also serve different functions, including extra-
legal ones. Litigation teaches advocates how to articulate and construct their arguments, while 
also expanding notions of what is right and just.181 The symbolic power of a court decision can 
also galvanize public opinion, mobilize advocates and other citizens, and spur legislative or other 
actions.182 Both Roe and Brown are examples where backlash spurred anti-abortion and anti-
integration efforts. In the case of Roe, the legal loss for anti-choice advocates became legislative 
wins as states passed increasingly restrictive abortion regulations. Progressives have also 
benefited from this dynamic. As one example, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,183 extending the 
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statute of limitations for pay equity cases, was passed in response to a losing Supreme Court 
decision.184 In another example, when the Court failed in Matthews v. Eldridge to extend the 
Kelly ruling to Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) recipients, Congress 
passed legislation providing for pre-termination hearings, which still exist today.185 A legislative 
win after a judicial loss can lead to more lasting social change, as the resulting laws, policies and 
programs become embedded in the life of a nation.  
While much about the current political environment seems unique, including the current 
Administration’s violations of basic institutional and constitutional norms and practices of 
governing,186 these lessons from the past still hold. As in the past, judicial intervention functions 
both as a legal strategy and a political resource. Legal action has stopped many illegal actions in 
their tracks, forcing the current Administration to recalibrate.187 Litigation has also served an 
educative function, providing a civics lessons to both the public and policymakers. It has made 
more visible the current and cumulative assaults on our democratic system, as the courts litigate 
such contentious issues as voter suppression, campaign financing and gerrymandering. For 
advocates, this education is invaluable as they strategize how best to advance the cause of social 
justice in these tumultuous times. 
Moreover, history demonstrates that legal action alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to 
secure lasting social change. It must be coupled with grassroots action and with appeals to the 
other branches of government, as the civil rights movement demonstrated in Brown.188 In short, 
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courts are only one player in a constellation of players, and their role may wax and wane. 
Electoral politics, especially in the current environment, is equally if not more important. A 
change in elected officials can change the conversation and ultimately change policy outcomes.  
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